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According to Paul Pierson and R. Kent Weaver, the “new politics of the welfare state” is about 
escaping the popular blame generated by cutbacks affecting a significant portion of the 
population. Although the concept of blame avoidance helps to explain the political logic of 
welfare state retrenchment, one can argue that a careful analysis of social policy reform should 
take into account a largely understudied phenomenon: protest avoidance. Especially present in 
countries with single party governments and politically active labor unions, protest avoidance is 
analytically distinct from blame avoidance because it occurs when policy-makers, facing direct 
and nearly inescapable blame, attempt to reduce the scope of social mobilization triggered by 
unpopular reforms. In recent decades, successive French governments have successfully 
introduced major—and unpopular—reforms in the field of pensions, despite the difficulties to 
frame blame avoidance strategies in the context of France's strong concentration of state power. 
Focusing on the 1993, 1995, and 2003 pension reform episodes, this paper seeks to demonstrate 
that right wing governments have generally tried to avoid protest rather than escape blame. We 
claim that the key element has been avoiding disruptive strike activities by the labor movement, 
which are highly political in France. We argue that right wing governments have attempted to 
divide the fragmented labor movement and overload the reform agenda while enacting its most 
controversial reforms during the summer holiday season. Protest avoidance thus represents a key 
political variable worthy of study in the literature on welfare state retrenchment. In the future, the 
concept of protest avoidance could be applied to other countries and policy areas in which 
elected officials attempt to impose unpopular reforms that trigger social mobilization.    
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The Politics of Protest Avoidance: Policy Windows, 





Since the 1980s, students of social policy, like Paul Pierson and Kent Weaver, have 
depicted welfare state retrenchment as a “politics of blame avoidance” (Weaver, 1986; Pierson, 
1994; Pierson, 2001). When implementing cutbacks and restructuring social programs, policy-
makers from the right and the left attempt to reduce political risks associated with the reform 
process. Distinct from the logic of credit claiming that was dominant in the post war era, the 
“new politics of the welfare state” is about escaping the popular blame generated by painful 
measures that affect the life of a significant portion of the population. Although the concept of 
blame avoidance is a useful one to explain the political logic of welfare state retrenchment, one 
can argue that a careful analysis of social policy reform should take into account a largely 
understudied phenomenon: protest avoidance. Especially present in countries with single party 
governments and politically active labor unions, protest avoidance is analytically distinct from 
blame avoidance because it occurs when policy-makers, facing direct and nearly inescapable 
blame, attempt to reduce the scope of social mobilization triggered by unpopular social policy 
reforms.
1 Since these painful reforms generally turn unions against elected officials pursuing 
them, the need to reduce labor’s mobilization capacity can be instrumental to the enactment and 
the successful implementation of such unpopular measures. In part because mobilization capacity 
varies over time, timing and “policy windows” are crucial variables in the politics of protest 
avoidance. Knowledge about timing and social mobilization is the outcome of strategic leaning 
processes distinct from the more technocratic type of “social learning” commonly discussed in 
the institutionalist literature.      2
In recent decades, successive French governments have successfully introduced major—
and generally unpopular—reforms in the field of pensions, despite the difficulties to put forward 
blame avoidance strategies in the context of France's strong concentration of state power. This 
paper seeks to demonstrate that the strategies utilized by governments have been to avoid protest 
rather than escape blame—the latter being extremely complicated in a country where state power 
is so centralized. We claim that the key element has been avoiding disruptive strike activities by 
the labor movement, which are highly political in France. We argue that governments have 
attempted to divide the fragmented labor movement while enacting its most controversial 
reforms during the summer holidays.
2 These strategies have permitted some right wing 
governments to impose their will upon a pension system officially managed by employers and 
labor unions, commonly referred to as “social partners.” The empirical findings are based on the 
analysis of successes and failures to reform the French pension system since the late 1960s, with 
a specific focus on the 1993, 1995, and 2003 reform attempts. The story of contemporary French 
pension reform since the 1960s shows how protest avoidance can emerge as a significant aspect 
of modern welfare state politics. 
 
Labor Unions and Welfare State Retrenchment 
Retrenchment is a far more difficult political enterprise than expanding social rights and 
benefits. According to Paul Pierson, social policy retrenchment is indeed a highly problematic 
task for policy-makers who face strong opposition from new interest groups tied to existing 
social programs. For Pierson, these groups emerge as “feedback effects” of welfare state 
development itself. During the post-war era, the creation of new social measures, as well as the 
enlargement of existing ones, favored the emergence of large constituencies interested in the   3
preservation of social security entitlements: “With these massive programs have come dense 
interest-group networks and strong popular attachments to particular policies, which present 
considerable obstacles to reform” (Pierson 1996: 146). Facing potential opposition from these 
growing constituencies, politicians pursuing a retrenchment agenda have frequently mobilized 
blame avoidance strategies in order to reduce the risk of electoral backlash related to the 
enactment of potentially unpopular reforms (Weaver, 1986).  
  A key problem with this historical and theoretical narrative concerns the status of labor 
unions in pension politics. In his 1996 article, Pierson argues that beneficiaries and their 
organizations (for example, the American Association for Retired Persons) play a greater role in 
today’s pension politics than labor unions, which are more associated with post-war welfare state 
expansion. Pierson goes further by dismissing the importance and utility of the power resource 
theory elaborated on the basis that unions and left wing parties have lost considerable power, 
while the welfare state has remained largely frozen (150-1). From this perspective, the study of 
labor mobilization does not constitute a crucial aspect of the politics of retrenchment.  
  Against this view, scholars working on pension reform—including Pierson himself—
have recently shown that “labor still matters” (Béland, 2001; Bonoli, 2000; Marier, 2002; Myles 
and Pierson, 2001; Natali and Rhodes, 2003; Palier and Miura, 2003). This is particularly true in 
Bismarckian countries, especially if labor unions are directly involved in trust funds 
management. As the state integrated social partners to the public pension system, unions 
identified themselves with it while framing ideological “property claims” over retirement 
benefits. Related to the modest development of private benefits, this identification to public 
pensions means that unions can mobilize more easily against potential cutbacks, which are 
perceived as a direct attack against unions’ managerial role (Béland, 2001; Bonoli, 2000; Marier,   4
2002). In such an institutional context, labor unions still play a major role in the contemporary 
politics of pension reform as mass mobilization and general strikes represent enduring political 
threats that may force the government in power to abandon retrenchment initiatives. The 1994 
strikes in Italy and the events of December 1995 in France provide ground to this claim 
(Pitruzello, 1997; Natali and Rhodes, 2003). Using massive strikes as a political weapon against 
politicians attempting to “impose pain” through retrenchment efforts, unions can thus act as 
“ideological veto players” in the politics of pension reform. Ideological representations tied to 
the integration of social partners with the public pension system can politically offset decline in 
union membership. In pension politics as elsewhere, unions’ political influence is loosely tied to 
membership rates as institutional and ideological factors potentially compensate for low 
membership (Béland, 2001).
3  
  Even in the case where labor is not represented in the formal managerial functions of 
pension schemes, unions can still exercise influence on the decisions of policy-makers via their 
ties with social democratic parties. Levy (1999) has argued that left wing parties have generated 
different kinds of retrenchment measures, while Korpi and Palme (2003) claim that “risk for 
major cuts has been significantly lower with left wing representation in cabinet, while the 
opposite holds true for secular conservative-centrist governments” (17). Even though the labor 
movement has lost most of its power and connections within New Labor in the UK, this is not 
the case in other European countries such as Sweden. The Swedish social democrats consulted 
the unions on a regular basis in the enactment of retrenchment measures in unemployment 
insurance and pension benefits (Andersen, 2001). However, this linkage does not guarantee a 
strong presence within the process leading up to policy change, and the entitlement principle is 
weaker because unions do not have the duty of managing the pension system. For example, it is   5
difficult to attach strong powers to unions when key aspects of the 1998 pension reform were 
negotiated among the five largest political parties, without union representation, and in the span 
of two weeks during the 1993 Christmas holidays. Swedish unions were left with a finished 
product difficult to alter because changes required the approval of the five political parties 
(Marier, 2002). The real alternative for unions was to force the social democrats to refute the 
negotiated agreement, which nearly happened during the 1997 congress of the party (Lundberg, 
2001). 
 
Understanding Protest Avoidance 
  Recognizing the enduring role of labor unions in pension politics in many OECD 
countries, it is possible to study how policy-makers attempt to avoid massive social mobilization 
against their pension proposals. In his work on pension reform, Giuliano Bonoli (1997; 2000) 
argues that in France, as in other European countries, policy-makers have bargained 
compromises (quid pro quos) with labor officials in order to guarantee the enactment of pension 
retrenchment while also reducing the potential scope of union protest. In Italy, the 1995 “Dini 
reform” was grounded in a similar bargaining logic between elected officials and union 
representatives (Natali and Rhodes, forthcoming). This bargaining strategy is only a specific 
example of a much broader political logic present in contemporary pension politics: protest 
avoidance. Especially common in countries in which massive strikes are both common and 
politically threatening for policy-makers, protest avoidance refers to the strategies where the 
central goal is to reduce the level of social mobilization in the context of potentially unpopular 
economic and social reforms. While blame avoidance defines strategies that deflect blame and 
reduce the possibility of future electoral backlash (Weaver, 1986), protest avoidance refers to a   6
distinct set of strategies that aim at reducing the possibility of social protest, which generally 
takes the form of massive strikes. Although blame avoidance and protest avoidance strategies 
frequently converge or even aggregate,
4 clear distinctions exist. On one hand, blame avoidance is 
about preventing, deflecting, or delaying blame.
5 On the other hand, protest avoidance 
exclusively concerns strategies that militate against labor mobilization and mass protest. In some 
contexts, for example, policy-makers could accept to face direct political blame for unpopular 
measures while taking actions to limit the scope of street protest that may degenerate and 
complicate reform. Protest avoidance is thus analytically distinct from blame avoidance. 
  Although the concept of protest avoidance is not present in the current literature on social 
policy reform, the fact that social mobilization can affect the behavior of elected officials and 
impact welfare state politics has been underlined elsewhere.
6 Generally, authors focusing on the 
relationship between social mobilization and public policy imply that those in power take the 
potential consequences of social disruption seriously. For instance, when Piven and Cloward 
argue that the power of the poor lies in their capacity to mobilize and disrupt, it follows that 
policy-makers attempt to deny them the resources they need to protest effectively (Piven and 
Cloward, 1971). In a sense, the concept of protest avoidance gives a name to and clarifies the 
analytical contours of something essential that has largely remained implicit in the existing 
literature on welfare state politics. 
Protest avoidance largely results from the fact that policy-makers are strategic actors that 
draw lessons from previous policy episodes. In the institutionalist literature, the concept of social 
learning traditionally defines how the evaluation of existing policy legacies influences future 
policy development. Criticizing the technocratic model of learning put forward by Hugh Heclo,
7 
political scientists Randall Hansen and Desmond King argue that learning processes are   7
inherently ideological and political (Hansen and King, 1999). But if drawing lessons from 
existing policies is a contentious process, officials in power seek to facilitate the enactment of 
their potentially controversial proposals based on strategic learning. This concept is analytically 
distinct from social learning. On the one hand, social learning occurs when “policy builds on 
policy.” From this perspective, the evaluation of a program’s economic and social consequences 
shapes subsequent policy decisions. On the other hand, strategic learning exists when elected 
officials constantly learn about political risks and opportunities related to timing, institutional 
structures, and the anticipated behavior of other social and political actors. Strategic learning 
thus enhances officials’ “awareness of structures and the constraints/opportunities they impose, 
providing the basis from which subsequent strategy might be formulated and perhaps prove more 
successful.” (Hay, 1995: 201)  
Underlying the learning and institutional mechanisms that shape political strategies, the 
concept of protest avoidance also emphasizes the importance of policy windows. As underlined 
by Kingdon (2003), policy entrepreneurs have a short window of opportunity to implement the 
policy alternatives they support. If they fail to grab the occasion granted by events such as the 
arrival of a new political coalition in power, external shock, and/or a shift in the national mood, 
they may end up waiting a long time before having another opportunity to advance their agenda.  
  Due to the strong emphasis placed on the institutional inertia of social policies, Pierson’s 
“new politics of the welfare state” approach does not really consider policy change, and even 
fewer windows of opportunity in its analysis. The key elements behind the resilience of the 
welfare state are the fear of electoral backlash, institutional inertia, and path dependency 
(Pierson, 1994). None of these tools appropriately considers the timing of policy change.
8   8
While political scientist John Kingdon largely bases his agenda setting theory analysis on 
the US, where it is rare to find compromise when the institutional setting creates a decentralized 
political system, his analysis is still pertinent to the study of policy-making in other countries 
such as France. In this case, the windows of opportunity in a protest avoidance strategy include 
many cyclical windows. Firstly, the aftermath of an election, commonly called the “honeymoon 
period,” provides governments effective opportunities to introduce unpopular measures. A 
government can claim that it has just received the mandate to perform these changes. Adding to 
this strength, the parties in the opposition are often disorganized following an electoral defeat as 
they question their party leadership and the policies they advocate. The new government can also 
make use of the electoral cycle. It can hope that the electorate will forget the introduction of 
unpopular measures in three or four years and remember only the good policies introduced prior 
to the elections. As underlined in a recent test of the electoral cycle in Canada, governments 
systematically cut public spending in non-electoral periods. However, spending is then increased 
near the time of elections (Petry et al., 1999). The focus on spending can be applied to public 
programs as well. For example, Levitt (1997) demonstrates that police hiring is 
disproportionately concentrated in election years.  
In the French case, the electoral cycle is slightly more difficult to consider. The possible 
presence of a political “cohabitation” between a President and a Prime Minister from different 
parties adds a twist to this dynamic. Mostly concerned with foreign affairs, the jurisdiction of a 
French President in domestic affairs during a period of cohabitation is extremely limited, which 
nullifies any potential presidential “veto point” (Immergut, 1992).
9 Nonetheless, this 
fragmentation of power has some influence when a Prime Minister seeks to challenge the 
President in an upcoming election. For example, Prime Ministers Edouard Balladur (1993-1995)   9
and Lionel Jospin (1997-2002) had been criticized for their inaction in the year preceding a 
Presidential election as it became evident that they were going to run for the Presidency. 
However, the electoral reform enacted in 2000 now ensures that the parliamentary and 
presidential elections coincide, meaning that the French electoral cycle should not be that 
different than the Canadian or British one.
10 
Secondly, even though it is somewhat of a French (and to a lesser extent Italian) 
specificity, unions use strikes as both a political tool to react against state policies and as a 
bargaining tool to obtain better benefits from their employers (see below). A series of unpopular 
measures can bring disastrous results for the government, as it was in France in December 1995. 
Thus, in countries like France and Italy, a government seeking to introduce change that is 
opposed by unions must consider a high potential for strike activities. Few political strategies—
such as quid pro quo bargaining—are available to government officials looking to reduce labor 
opposition. Unions, aware of the political cycle and the political harm strike action may cause, 
are more likely to be cooperative when elections are looming. Strengthening this power is the 
fact that most strikes in France receive strong support from the population, as evidenced in 
opinion polls where opposing union mobilization is the exception rather than the rule (see 
below).  
Thirdly, the literature on welfare retrenchment shows that one-party governments find it 
very difficult to escape blame (see Pierson and Weaver, 1993; Vail, 1999). This follows from a 
majoritarian vision that emphasizes a concentration of power and policy-making capabilities (see 
Powell, 2000). In most countries with one-party governments, the executive is strong, visible, 
and highly centralized. For example, the thesis of blame avoidance is rather difficult to apply to 
pension reforms in the UK considering that Thatcher never hid her preferences for a greater role   10
for the private sector and maintained a weakened income-related public pension program (State 
Earnings Related Pension Scheme—SERPS) as a result of criticism from her own supporters. 
One way to escape protest is to practice a strategy of “reform overload.” By discussing a wide 
range of reforms, citizens, union officials, and interest groups come to expect the worst. With the 
aggregation of many reform objectives, the oppositions centers on a package reducing the 
number of times groups may mobilize. Moreover, reform packages can also “spread the pain” by 
making an individual’s protest appear as less legitimate. By retrieving a few of these reforms the 
government is seen as cooperative and responsive to the criticism made to reform projects. 
Nonetheless, some reform objectives are met. In this vein, the presentation of a Green paper 
advocating the abolition of SERPS, and the adoption of personal pensions and the reduction in 
SERPS benefit made the latter seem far less radical, which has the effect of reducing the scope of 
protest against the reform.
11 To a certain extent, what has been said about one-party governments 
applies to stable coalition governments such as those elected under France’s Fifth Republic 
(1958-). Avoiding blame proves difficult for these governments, and “reform overload” 
constitutes a known practice in France (see below). 
Drawing on the above discussion, one can distinguish three main forms of protest 
avoidance. Firstly, policy-makers can attempt to divide the labor movement by securing the 
support of more moderate labor unions. This strategy can prove especially successful in countries 
like France where the labor movement is already highly fragmented among organizational and 
ideological lines. Secondly, “reform overload” becomes another way to reduce social 
mobilization by simultaneously putting forward many policy proposals on the table. By later 
removing some of them from the reform agenda, governments may reduce the scope of protest 
by presenting this gesture as a compromise. Finally, policy-makers may decide to enact   11
contentious proposals at a time when labor unions are not in a good position to fully mobilize 
their members and supporters. For example, they may enact a reform as the labor movement is 
facing strong internal divisions or when many workers are on vacation and away from the cities 
where major protests take place. A little studied phenomenon, this third protest avoidance 
strategy has been used in France for three of the most important changes to the pension systems 
enacted since the 1960s, and all of them were at first strongly opposed by unions.  
When underlining this third protest avoidance strategy, this article suggests that reform 
timing matters, especially in countries where blame avoidance strategies are difficult to 
introduce. In such a context, political actors can benefit from launching the reform at a moment 
when opponents (such as labor unions and other organized interests) would find it difficult to 
mobilize. Before studying specific pension reform attempts, the next section briefly reconstructs 
their historical and institutional background through a general discussion about labor politics and 
pension reform in France.   
 
Labor Politics and Pension Reform in France 
Divided and politically frail unions tend to oppose collaboration with strong states 
(Marks 1989; Lipset 1983). Since the 19
th century, the French labor movement has remained 
highly fragmented among organizational and political lines (Karila-Cohen and Wilfert, 1998). 
Moreover, state building in France has involved a stark centralization of power (Rokkan, 1999) 
and most unions have thus adopted a pugnacious attitude towards the state. As a consequence of 
a strikingly asymmetrical distribution of power between divided unions and a centralized state, 
modern corporatism and social democracy never became dominant patterns in France (Jobert and 
Muller 1987; Keeler 1985). As opposed to the situation prevailing in Sweden or in Germany,   12
confrontation between the state and labor unions, rather than collaboration, is the most common 
practice, and the strike represents one of the only political tools in the hands of weak unions 
paradoxically seeking state protection and institutional autonomy from the state. The political 
strike has thus become the most central element of French labor’s “repertoire of contention.”
12 
According to Birnbaum, “The working class has always been excluded from the state; it always 
had to act conflictively.” (Birnbaum, 1988: 123) This is the reason why unions have supported 
the constitution of a social insurance system “outside the state” (Ashford, 1986).  
Before discussing the features of the French social insurance system, one should note that 
this apparent weakness of the French labor movement essentially concerns the private sector, 
where unionization rates are generally inferior to 10 percent. Furthermore, private workers are 
largely represented in one union, the CFDT (Confédération Française Démocratique du 
Travail). Ironically, because of the weight of the state in French society, public employees tend 
to dominate the labor movement as unionization rates are higher in the public sector than in the 
private one (approximately 20 percent on average versus only 5-6 percent).
13 Moreover, the 
public sector is perceived as a crucial component of French society rooted in a universalistic 
model of state sovereignty. As the following quotation suggests, universalistic claims 
paradoxically justify occupational privileges:  
The notion of a service public is introduced to guarantee the universality and non-
arbitrariness of the state’s relation to the individual by a double mechanism. On 
the one hand, the service public refers to the civil servants whose devotion to the 
common good is ensured by such mechanisms as the meritocratic form of 
recruitment, the guarantee of job security, and a rational-bureaucratic execution of 
its tasks as mandated by laws voted by the political representatives of the nation   13
as a whole. On the other hand, the service public refers to those domains of social 
life which are the concern of all the citizens (Howard, 1998).   
Traditionally perceived as the elite of a nation attached to state-sponsored universalism, civil 
servants enjoy much prestige in France, and attacks against their occupational status is generally 
understood as a threat against the service public itself and the integrity of the nation as a whole. 
Forming the “cream of the crop” of the labor movement, public sector employees have access to 
more organizational and symbolic resources to mobilize politically against the powerful state for 
which they work. Paradoxically, the mobilization of civil servants can be understood as a societal 
contre-poids to elected officials who would choose to undermine the status of the state and its 
employees, who depict themselves as the agents of universalism and equal citizenship.  
As the two paragraphs above show, French strikes, especially public sector ones, have an 
immediate political significance and are not imagined as mere tools of collective bargaining, as it 
is the case in North America, for example. But, explicitly or implicitly, French strikes inevitably 
deal with the specific interests of occupational groups, particularly civil servants and employees 
of public enterprises such as Electricité de France (EDF) and the Société Nationale des Chemins 
de Fer (SNCF). Many strikes also deal with pension-related issues, because union officials and 
their allies have depicted them as an “indirect wage” (salaire différé) related to specific 
occupational status. This perception is linked to the fact that the French pension system is 
fragmented among occupational lines, and those specific professional categories—including civil 
servants—have their own public pension scheme (Palier 1999: 240). Such a fragmentation 
remains an obstacle to the emergence of organizations representing French retirees as a whole 
(Viriot Durandal, 2003).    14
Some historical background is necessary to understand better labor’s identification with 
public pensions. In France, the history of public sector and private sector workers diverge 
strongly. Public sector workers are entitled to a pension that is itemized as a wage in the budget 
of the Republic. During interviews with policy-makers, many pointed out that they had 
traditionally waited for the diffusion of the budget in order to know how much was spent on 
pensions and how many public servants were actually retired (Marier, 2002). This situation 
results from a series of conflict in the mid 1800s between politicians and bureaucrats following 
the abolition of discretionary treatments in 1790. As underlined by the French specialist of public 
sector pensions, Guy Thuillier, the law of 1853 eliminated the notion of insurance in the system 
by making pensions a sort of continuous pay if necessary conditions were fulfilled (cited from 
Friot, 1994: 80). Pensions gradually became considered as a right and were included in the 
definition of a civil servant in 1909 (Friot, 1995: 50).
14  
The existing public pension system for private sector workers was established 
immediately after the Libération. Although the founders of post-war Social Security attempted to 
create a more universalistic pension system, it proved impossible to transcend the opposition of 
occupational groups (farmers, civil servants, railroad workers, white collars) rooted in the 
fragmented institutional logic of the previous public pension system established in 1930 (Saint-
Jours, 1982; Baldwin, 1990). As underlined by both Ashford (1986) and Baldwin (1990) the 
creation of a universal scheme proved too ambitious, and the redistribution of risks in favor of 
blue-collar workers was far too visible too succeed. Thus, the régime général does not cover all 
private sector workers. Specific professional categories gained coverage under régimes spéciaux 
(separate public pension schemes) that generally reflected pre-1945 pension divisions.    15
Between 1945 and 1967, only labor unions were authorized to participate in the 
management process of the French public pension system. This reality reflects the growing 
strength of labor unions in the immediate post-war era and, perhaps more importantly, the fact 
that the collaboration between some enterprises and the pro-Nazi Vichy regime had discredited 
business representatives (Guillemard, 1986: 50). The right was thus forced into a defensive 
position. However, the left was only able to secure a majority in the fragmented Fourth Republic 
during the first year following its proclamation. This had dire consequences. The amalgamation 
of occupational plans into a universal pension scheme for private sector workers advocated in the 
Larocque Plan and legislated in 1945 never took place. The status quo was reinforced with the 
creation of a complementary pension regime for white-collar workers in 1947 and, two decades 
later, the advent of a special scheme for self-employed workers (Baldwin, 1990: 170-2).  
Following the creation of the Fifth Republic in 1958, the tables turned. The political 
power of the Left declined drastically compared to the aftermath of World War II. The 
management of pensions by unions became a point of contention. Already in the early 1960s, the 
state became more involved in the administration of pensions. Three new conditions were 
introduced. Firstly, the government sought to restrain accessibility to the board by mandating the 
elections of union representatives from a pre-selected list approved by the ministry of social 
affairs. Secondly, 80 percent of the candidates had to come from the newly created Centre 
national d’études supérieures de la Sécurité Sociale.
15 Finally, each new director had to receive 
the approval of the ministry before beginning his/her term (Join-Lambert, 1997: 450-1).  
Reform activities would not stop there. Many reports underlined large deficits with social 
security in 1965 and the government opted to pay closer attention to this issue. The year 1967 
began with a key debate concerning the inclusion of farmers and other independent workers into   16
the general scheme. Georges Pompidou, then France’s Prime Minister, waited until mid-August 
to re-organize social security despite protest from union officials, who could hardly mobilize 
their members during summer vacation. The “summer strategy” proved successful. Although 
retrenchment was not an issue at stake, this reform restructured the managerial system of the 
French pension in a most significant manner and removed the monopoly enjoyed by unions. The 
French social security system was split into three different boards: sickness, old age, and family. 
Further, business representatives gained seats on public pension boards, holding 50 percent of 
the appointments. Called paritarisme,
16 this system has never been entirely acknowledged by the 
more radical unions (Confédération Générale du Travail—CGT, Force Ouvrière—FO), who 
have claimed to be the only true defenders of acquis sociaux (“conquered rights”) (Béland, 
2001). Finally, restricting the legitimacy of these boards was the governmental decision to 
abolish elections and replace them by nominations by each of the social partners.  
 
Three Reform Episodes 
  This section presents three key attempts made by successive governments in France since 
1993. Most of the emphasis is placed on the 2003 attempt, but the earlier ones (1993, 1995) add 
to the empirical case because they help to emphasize the theoretical attributes outlined above. An 
interesting point of this analysis is the presence of two successful cases and one failure. The 
latter case proves to be extremely valuable in explaining the roots of success behind the other 
three cases. We complete this section with a systematic discussion about the application of the 
concept of protest avoidance on pension reform in France. 
 
   17
The Balladur Government and Pension Retrenchment  
The 1993 French pension reform supports the concept of protest avoidance, especially as 
it is related to the timing of policy reforms. During the 1980s and early 1990s, various official 
reports framed the apparent “need to reform” the French pension system.
17 Like in other 
advanced industrial countries, the rise of neo-liberalism, short-term financial concerns, and also 
growing demographic fears increasingly transformed massive pension retrenchment into a 
serious, if unpopular and risky, option for policy-makers (Renard, 1999). In France, like 
elsewhere, the “new politics of the welfare state” favored a shift from policy expansion to 
retrenchment. Throughout the 1980s, politicians were very hesitant to tackle this issue as 
demonstrated by the heavy reliance on commissions and external committees. Following an 
impressive electoral victory in April 1993, where 81.8 percent of all seats belonged to the right, 
the Balladur government wasted no time in tackling the issue of pension retrenchment. A few 
weeks into its mandate, the government convened the social partners to discuss the issue. After 
the meeting, the social partners were surprised by the clarity of the government's intentions. 
Other meetings followed in May between the social partners and the Minister of Social Affairs, 
Simone Veil. According to a student of French social policy (Vail, 1999), Prime Minister 
Balladur wanted to give the illusion of creating consensus, and this reality did not dupe union 
officials. Blondel, leader of FO, stated that “in a soft, mild way, the Prime Minister is trying to 
impose an austerity plan on us.” (Vail, 1999: 321) The measures were presented in mid-May and 
they were based on the Livre blanc sur les retraites (White Book on Pensions) prepared by the 
Cabinet of the Former Socialist Prime Minister, Michel Rocard. This reference and the complete 
disarray of the Left after the elections of 1993 silenced the parliamentary opposition.   18
The government opted first to send flowers to the social partners by introducing a good 
will measure in June, which was followed by the vase in mid-August during the summer holiday 
season. The Fonds de solidarité vieillesse (FSV) would come to life in early June to finance 
solidarity measures for the régime général, which would be raised by the increase in the special 
health care tax (Contribution Sociale Généralisée) (from 1,1 percent to 2,4 percent) and a new 
tax on alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages. A fraction of contributions would also be re-
directed to this fund (Ruellan, 1993: 917). This plan had long been supported by unions, which 
demanded a clearer separation between contributive and non-contributive aspects of the régime 
général. This recognized the role of social partners in the management of social security, and can 
be considered as part of a non-confrontational stance vis-à-vis the unions (Bonoli, 2000: 138). 
Even though this measure did nothing to reduce the costs of pensions, it nonetheless provided 
new sources of financing. A few days later, social partners convened and met with the Minister 
of Social Affairs in June and were then received individually by Balladur at the end of the 
month. The outcome of these meetings received strong public reactions from the three main 
unions (FO, CGT, CFDT), who claimed that there were no real consultations (Vail, 1999: 321).  
          The government would go ahead with other aspects of its plan and introduced the first 
retrenchment measures on pensions. First, along with the legislation creating the FSV, the 
government included a legislation indexing pensions on price, a measure that would have to be 
renewed in five years by decree.
18 This made law a practice that had occurred since 1987 
(Ruellan, 1993: 919). A decree (No 93-1023) adopted later (August 27), would set an increase in 
the amount granted to pensioners based on the expected inflation (average price increase 
excluding tobacco products). Any discrepancies between the expected and real inflation would 
be corrected the following year.   19
          Second, two other measures would be instituted via Decree No. 93-1024 (August, 27). The 
length of the contribution required in order to obtain a full pension was increased from 150 
quarters (37.5 years) to 160 quarters (40 years) progressively starting in 1994. The reform will be 
implemented over a period of 10 years, by adding a quarter every year until 2003. The other 
measure tackled the period under which the pension is calculated, which was based under the 10 
best years. The number of years was increased to 25 very progressively, by adding a year starting 
in 1994 for the next 15 years (or until 2008).  
          Contrary to many expectations, the reform did not generate a widespread backlash against 
the government, or a strong negative reaction from the social partners besides the CGT, which 
could not mobilize its members at this specific time of the year. The timing of the reform 
reduced the scope of potential protest against retrenchment measures. Even though the 
government shied away from criticism that it introduced a reform in the middle of the holiday 
season, Balladur surely used the strategic lesson from his days as conseiller social (social 
advisor) to Pompidou in 1967 when the major management reform of the pension system was 
introduced successfully. Like that, the feared pension reform passed without much opposition. 
This was a far cry from Rocard's 1991 statement that this issue “could break a government” 
(Marier, 2002). 
 
The Juppé Plan and the 1995 Strikes 
  The election of right-winger Jacques Chirac as President in 1995 marked the end of the 
“cohabitation” between the left and the right. In order to distance himself from Balladur (a right 
wing Prime Minister and presidential candidate), Chirac’s campaign geared itself towards the 
middle of the political spectrum by promising to repair the apparent “social fracture” that France   20
had been experiencing. He even went as far as to argue that economic growth could ensure a 
freeze on social security cuts (Bonoli, 2000: 142). President Chirac’s first action was to replace 
Balladur with one of his staunchest supporter, Alain Juppé. This resulted in something rather 
similar to a change of government with President Chirac being firmly in control of national and 
international affairs. Some ministers of the previous government returned, but the entire Cabinet 
at Matignon was made up of new faces. 
  Seven months following the Presidential election, France entered into a severe economic 
recession resulting in speculative attacks on the Franc and public doubts that it could join the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Pitruzzello, 1997). During the summer of 1995, the 
Juppé government admitted that it was studying proposals to reform the social security system. 
However, Juppé stressed that he would have broader consultations than previous French 
governments. He met the social partners in September and underlined the unfairness of the 
pension system with civil servants having to contribute “only” 37.5 years for a full pension as 
opposed to 40 years for private sector workers. The Briet report, commissioned by Balladur but 
concluded under Juppé, presented a bleaker picture than earlier reports on pensions claiming that 
an increase in contribution of 2.4 percent was necessary. It was also quite critical of the 
disparities between the regular civil servant schemes and the so-called régimes spéciaux (Briet, 
1995).
19 
  Following the announcement of a wage freeze in the public service, the seven major labor 
unions agreed on a day of strikes on October 10, thus sending a serious warning to the 
government in the midst of rumors that it was considering increasing the length of contributions 
for public sector workers to reach 40 years as in the private sector.
20 Following a meeting with 
Chirac on November 12, the social partners were positive about the prospects of maintaining the   21
status quo (Marier, 2002: 92). Further, unions were informed on a non-official basis that the 
pension reform was left off the agenda (Bonoli, 2000: 143).  Surprisingly, even to some of his 
own ministers, Juppé announced the most drastic changes to the whole security system on 
November 15. The Juppé Plan tackled pensions, health, and family benefits. The key feature of 
the reform was the universalization of health insurance by increasing the reliance on taxation for 
its financing while eliminating the social contributions and the various health schemes. 
  With regards to pensions, Juppé announced that the parliament would have a larger role 
in budgetary decisions related to social security. Further, a new fund (caisse) was introduced to 
cover public sector workers so that its finances would no longer be lost in the general budget of 
the state. The most controversial aspect of the plan was the lengthening of contributions for 
public sectors workers from 37.5 years to 40 years. Despite the way the plan was introduced and 
the severity of the changes, the opposition and the social partners were very slow to react. 
Unions divided rapidly with the announcement that the CFDT supported the direction of the 
reforms. With a high stakes in the administration of health schemes and a strong membership 
within the civil service, FO asked for the immediate removal of these measures. The CGT shared 
similar views. While the CFDT remained in favor of the changes in health, it would eventually 
present its opposition to the pension reform creating the opportunity for a strong common front 
among the unions. The business lobby (Conseil National du Patronat Français) underlined the 
courage of the government and the necessity to reform the pension system (Marier, 2002). 
  Starting with railway workers and followed closely by subway workers, a strike 
movement gathered momentum at the end of November.
21 By December 5, hundreds of 
thousands of protesters were in the street and the Juppé government defeated a motion of non-
confidence. In a television address, Juppé proposed that he was willing to meet the social   22
partners and create a special commission to discuss the pension reform. Despite the above-
mentioned split in the union movement, the protest wave grew larger with the addition of 
teachers on December 7 and a strong support from the population. On the 10
th, Juppé surrendered 
on the pension front by suspending the newly created commission and stating that he never 
meant to dismantle the régimes spéciaux. The unions received a letter stating that reforming 
public sector pensions was now off the agenda. The strikes would continue for another week 
concerning the other aspects of the plan, reaching a climax on December 12 with between one 
and two million protesters in the streets. 
  Although these massive strikes heavily affected everyday life, especially public 
transportation, surveys made in December 1995 show that a majority of the French population 
supported the strikers (Mouriaux and Subileau, 1996: 303). This reality probably reflects the fact 
that radical unions and their supporters framed this defense of occupational rights as a defense of 
the  service public and the droits acquis (earned rights) derived from past labor struggles 
(Blondel, 1995; 1996). Although intellectuals associated with the journal Esprit signed a petition 
against the strikes, many prominent left wing figures (for example sociologist Pierre Bourdieu) 
openly supported what they described as a battle against neo-liberalism and for the preservation 
of the public sector and the universalistic values attached to it (Le Monde, December 15, 1995). 
  Even thought the pension reform was stopped, it is important to note that elements of the 
Juppé Plan passed. This is especially true of its health-related component (Palier, 1999). 
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile noting the reasons why the pension elements of the Juppé Plan 
failed. Firstly, the timing of the government could not have been worse in terms of cutting social 
benefits to civil servants, especially those employed by the railway (SNCF) and public transit 
systems (notably the Régie autonome des transports parisiens—RATP). The government was   23
already struggling to negotiate with the unions for a new strategic plan to reduce the deficits of 
these public enterprises. This bargaining appeared as essential since, in recent years, labor unions 
in these two public companies launched 80 percent of all strikes. Further, by announcing the plan 
in November, it was easy for union officials to mobilize the workforce and cause chaos in Paris. 
Reports from Le Monde indicated that it took four to five hours for people to reach their 
workplace (Marier, 2002: 95). 
  Secondly, as underlined by Bonoli (2000), the approach undertaken by Juppé helped the 
unions since they could claim that they were not consulted in a domain where they have formal 
management powers. Further, adding to public support for the strikers, Chirac’s endorsement of 
the Plan apparently contradicted his 1995 campaign pledge to aggressively fight the “social 
fracture.”   
  At this point, it is worthwhile studying the causes behind Juppé’s actions. His timing was 
awful and he even led unions to believe that pension reform was not going to be on the agenda. 
As discussed above, these two elements were key reasons behind the failure of the pension 
reform for public sector workers. Right after the announcement, one center-right deputy, Jean-
Louis Borloo, had even predicted that ‘this will end up in the street with a kick in the butt’ (Le 
Monde, 21 December 1995).
22 As underscored by Vail (1999) who claimed that his plan 
represented a case of welfare Bonapartism, Juppé adopted a very confrontational attitude by 
simultaneously attacking different aspects of social security and organized groups while refusing 
to negotiate. This action was further enhanced (not to say triggered) by his ‘paternalistic 
arrogance’ (322). Not only did Juppé ignore the realities of France’s social contract, he even 
made strong efforts to ensure secrecy for the development of his proposals. According to 
Bourget (1998), only four social advisors and high-level civil servants, the Prime Minister, and   24
the President had been involved in the preparation of the so-called Juppé plan (169). Further, an 
interview with a former social advisor to Balladur confirmed that no one from his team had been 
contacted on this project despite their previous experience and (relatively) close political 
connection (interview with Patrik Marier, December 2001). Thus, the lack of strategic learning in 
this case has a lot to do with the personality of the Prime Minister and his cabinet. If anything, 
this reform reinforced the need to (at the very least) consult unions prior to undertaking reform 
activities. This was at the heart of the Balladur approach taken in 1993. It also reinforces the 
argument that timing matters. 
 
The 2003 Pension Reform     
 
  In the aftermath of the 1995 pension protest and the 1997 legislative elections, the 
Socialists came back to power under the leadership of Lionel Jospin. This launched a new era of 
“cohabitation” between the left and the right as President Chirac did not face reelection until 
2002. In this context, the Socialist government was very cautious in its actions.
23 The 
government opted to appoint a special commission headed by Jean-Michel Charpin the head of 
the Commissariat Général du Plan, an influential planning agency associated with the office of 
the Prime Minister. Instead of appeasing the field, the report generated further controversy by 
advocating a lengthening contribution period for both public and private sector regimes while 
stressing that efforts needed to be made to maintain cohesiveness between the public and private 
sectors (Charpin, 1999). The report was applauded by employers and heavily criticized by 
unions. An alternative plan, presented less than a year later by René Teulade at the Conseil 
économique et social,  challenged the validity of the Charpin report as it argued that high 
economic growth alone could resolve anticipated financial programs related to demographic   25
aging. Thus, according to this report, the government should adopt a strategy of favoring good 
jobs for younger generations instead of seeking to reform pensions. The unions endorsed this 
report while employers and economists criticized it. Feeling the political pressure of an 
upcoming election, Jospin opted to create a broader pension committee (Conseil d’orientation 
des retraites—COR) to consider pension reform in greater perspective. The first report published 
at the end of 2001 advocated a wide range of options and served as the “new” basis of discussion 
(COR, 2001). However, with elections coming in the spring of 2003, the Jospin government 
opted to remain idle on this issue. If some of the pension reports published under Jospin 
increased the apparent “need to reform,” the maintenance of the left wing coalition appeared to 
be more important than reforming the pension system in a comprehensive manner. 
  Already in the electoral campaign, political parties stated that pensions needed to be 
reformed on the basis of the recent work of COR, but refused to be too specific. Early in 2003, 
the new right wing government of Jean-Pierre Raffarin hinted that it was studying reform 
scenarios. In mid-April, the Civil Service and Social Affairs Ministers (Jean-Paul Delevoye and 
François Fillon, respectively), met the social partners to open discussions on the subject of 
pension reforms.
24 They presented a text that contained a draft of possible reforms to the pension 
system. Interestingly, the so-called régime spéciaux were absent from the discussions.
25 Among 
the key proposals presented were an extension of the contribution period in the public sector 
scheme so that a contribution period of 40 years would be required in both private and public 
sectors by 2008. The government also planned to abolish the measure granting full pensions to 
women that have fifteen years of contributions and three children. Still, with regards to public 
sector workers, in order to discourage early retirement the government was planning to add a 3 
percent penalty per non-contributed year and add up to 2-3 percent for each supplementary year   26
worked after the age of 60.
26 As compromises, the government presented a plan to reduce the 10 
percent penalty for each year retired prior to 60 in order to harmonize the penalties. Further, the 
government planned to promote individual savings, raise the level of the minimal pensions for 
those who have consistently contributed with a low wage, and grant full pensions to individuals 
that have met the contribution requirement prior to age 60 under specific conditions (workers 
with careers that began at age 14 or 15). The latter measure was seen as a way to obtain the 
support of the CFDT since it had been one of their key demands in the past 15 years. The two 
ministers also argued that these propositions could still be altered in theory prior to their 
presentation to the ministerial cabinet at the end of May. 
  The response from the unions was swift and decisive. Not surprisingly, more radical 
unions such as FO, CGT, UNSA (Union Nationale des Syndicats Autonomes), and FSU 
(Fédération Syndicale Unitaire) stressed the social regression apparent in the measures and 
quickly condemned them as being purely financially motivated. The CGT claimed that the 
measures would result in a 20 percent of lost retirement income while FO’s leader stated that this 
kind of proposal necessitated an immediate strike. More surprising, however, was the opposition 
of the CFDT, which had approved the orientations of the governmental policy on retirement in 
March. It argued that the counter measures (quid pro quo) were insufficient and that most of 
these measures represented short-term solutions. Its leader stated that “the total does not add up” 
(Le Monde, April 18, 2003).
27 The increasingly powerful new employers’ lobby created in 1998 
(Mouvement des Employeurs de France) was happy with the orientations of the reform since it 
avoided contribution hikes. Its President suggested that the government acted quickly because it 
had a large majority and elections were not forthcoming (Le Monde, April 23, 2003).   27
  Despite the united opposition to the reform among the unions, the organization of a 
common action proved difficult. More radical FO and, to a lesser extent, CGT both promoted a 
hard line by requesting the withdrawal of the reform while the reformist CFDT and the white 
collar union CFE-CGC (Confédération Française de l’Encadrement—Confédération Générale 
des Cadres) remained optimistic that a compromise could be worked out with the government. 
As such, the unions agreed to strike on May 13 and presented a common text that included a line 
on the need to reform pensions at the request of CFDT (Le Monde, April 24, 2003). Two 
independent opinion polls conducted a few days prior to the May 13 strikes provided them with 
an additional lift as more than 60% of the population proclaimed their support for the protest 
activities organized by the unions (Le Monde, May 12, 2003). 
  In the weeks prior to the strikes, the tone escalated on both sides. The CGT continued to 
argue that the reform proposal would cut pensions by close to 30 percent and proposed a new tax 
on profits to finance the shortcomings of the system. The French Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre 
Raffarin, stated that he was willing to have a constructive dialogue with the unions and that he 
would not tolerate any labor interruption. One week prior to the strikes of May 13, Raffarin was 
defiant and even stated publicly that “the street can give its views, but the street does not govern” 
(Le Monde, May 8, 2003). A publicity agency was even hired to sell the reform to the public. A 
full-page newspaper add was published and flyers were sent to French homes. Public teachers 
already in conflict with the government over the issue of decentralization and budget cuts 
organized a strike day on May 4. Raffarin harsh words combined with accentuated difficulties 
with a section of the public workforce brought comparison to the strikes of December 1995, 
when the Juppé plan collided with difficult negotiations in the railway sector. But since teachers’   28
strikes have more modest, short-term economic consequences than widespread transportation 
strikes, the situation seemed less politically hazardous than in the fall of 1995.  
  The strikes of May 13 sent a chilling message to the government. With more than 60 
percent of workers on strike (compared to 30 percent in 1995) and one to two million citizens in 
the street, the opposition to the reform proposals gathered strength (Le Monde, May 14, 2003).
28 
Fillon contacted the CFDT and CFE-CGC, and a negotiation session lasting more than 10 hours 
occurred between the parties (Le Monde, May 14, 2003). Following the promise on the part of 
the government to increase the minimal pensions for low wages (from the proposed 75 percent of 
minimum wage to 85 percent), increase pensions beyond inflation, increase pensions for the so-
called pluri-pensionnés (those who belong to multiple schemes), and solidify the commitment to 
grant full pensions to those who started contributing at the age of 14, 15, or 16 with a full 
career,
29 the CFDT and CFE-CGE announced their support to the reform on May 15. The CFTC 
did not formally endorse the plan, but stopped its (active) opposition (Le Monde, July 23, 2003). 
This reality illustrates the effectiveness of the first protest avoidance strategy defined above. 
More radical unions (FO, CGT, UNSA and FSU) called for continued actions by 
planning other demonstrations. Despite pressures from within, the CGT did not advise its 
members to imitate FO and start a general strike.
30 At the end of May, however, teachers 
launched a general strike. The most significant movement occurred on June 3 when 450,000 to 
1.5 million citizens were in the streets. However, the striking rate had decreased by half 
compared to May 13. Subways and trains continued to operate as a result of weaker 
mobilization. Another important day of actions was June 19, when demonstrators numbered 
between 116,000 and 320 900 individuals with little effects on many services such as public 
transportation. This would be the last significant action by union members to stop the reform (Le   29
Monde, June 19, 2003). This can be described as the outcome of the third form of protest 
avoidance: as the time for summer vacations approached, it became more and more difficult for 
union officials to mobilize their members.  
In the meantime, opposition MPs sought to disturb the legislative process by introducing 
amendments. During the proceedings from June 10 to July 24, the Communists presented nearly 
7000 amendments, while the deeply divided Socialists introduced 2900 (Le Monde, July 23, 
2003). Ironically, these actions might have helped the government because it delayed the 
adoption of the bill in Parliament later in the summer. Unions were unable to maintain their 
opposition as the number of protesters declined continuously throughout the parliamentary 
procedures. The bill was finally adopted on July 24, a time of the year when a significant portion 
of potential protesters is vacation. A few days later, however, a group of Socialist deputies and 
Senators challenged the validity of the reform and sent the bill to the Constitutional Counsel for 
further examination claiming that it violated the principles of equality enshrined in the 




Although the French government actually makes all the major decisions concerning 
pension contributions and benefits, labor unions have used massive political strikes as a device to 
protect their “property claims” over the pension system while defending the social rights of their 
members. If pension-related protests illustrate the institutional weakness of unions that cannot 
always have their voice heard within the government, such pension strikes may reinforce the   30
social and political legitimacy of labor unions as the only genuine defenders of social and 
economic rights in France.  
Facing the threat of massive pension-related protests, French policy-makers have 
attempted to reduce the mobilization capacity of labor unions using the three protest avoidance 
strategies defined above: dividing the labor movement, “reform overload,” and enacting 
contentious proposals when labor unions are not in a favorable position to mobilize their 
militants. Besides the 1993 and 2003 reforms discussed above, the 1967 pension reform that 
integrated business representatives within public pension boards is a stunning example of what 
could be labeled as the “summer strategy” of French policy-makers. This strategy is grounded in 
the fact that most French workers, especially those of the public sector, take their vacations in 
July and August, and that union workers seldom mobilize during these two months. As 
evidenced by Graph 1, there is a sharp decline in the number of days of strike in the summer 
months, especially in August. During this month, averages of 6,500 days of strike have occurred. 
This represents less than 1.3% of all days of strike recorded annually. This is in stark contrast 
with the other months, especially winter ones, when the average is above the 40,000 mark. 
March dominates with an average of 60,400 days of strike (12.2%). It is also worth noting that 
the only months below the 40,000 mark are July, August and September. They represent an 
average of less than 14% of all days of strike. 
When policy-makers fail to reduce labor opposition (first protest avoidance strategy), 
overload the reform agenda (second protest avoidance strategy), and/or pass controversial 
pension legislation when unions are in a difficult position to mobilize their troops (third protest 
avoidance strategy), massive strikes can have dramatic consequences and even force elected 
officials to abandon their proposals. The faith of the 1995 Juppé Plan illustrates how the failure   31
to adopt the right combination of protest avoidance strategies can turn the street against elected 
officials in power. It also demonstrates the importance of failing to learn from previous 
successful strategies adopted to introduce unpopular reforms. Contrary to the 2003 reform, which 
was enacted during the summer months and after consultations with the unions as in the Balladur 
reform, Juppé stubbornly and forcefully pushed his plans with apparently disastrous results. By 
virtue of his arrogance and desire to distance himself from the Balladur administration (Vail, 
1999), valuable strategic lessons were lost. However, arrogance does not mean stupidity. As 
underlined by Pitruzzello (1997), in the mid-1990s, many European governments were 
struggling to meet the Maastricht criteria. Further, the “threat” of not joining the Euro-zone 
represented an effective tool to facilitate the enactment of unpopular social and economic 
reforms in countries such as Belgium and Italy. In this sense, Juppé mobilized this specific 
strategy to avoid blame while reducing potential protest. It must be stressed, however, that such 
argument had far less weight in France than in the above-mentioned countries because the 
creation of a Euro-zone without France was not considered realistic. The defeat of the right wing 
parties in the snap election called by President Chirac in 1997 only confirmed that the reference 
to Maastricht proved an ineffective strategy. 
From Juppé’s perspective, the harmonization of the public sector schemes with the 
régime général represented a key policy issue because they faced significant financial 
challenges. In the name of droits acquis and the defense of the service public, radical labor 
unions (FO, CGT) opposed this measure, as well as the attempt to increase government's control 
on health insurance spending. Contrasting with Balladur’s 1993 conciliatory strategy, Juppé kept 
his contentious proposals secret until he officially submitted them to the French parliament. 
Immediately after that, all labor unions, except the conciliatory CFDT, demonstrated their anger,   32
launching the biggest wave of strikes since May 1968. Finally, unable to counter labor 
mobilization so far away from the summer vacations, Juppé finally moved back concerning the 
harmonization of public sector pension schemes with the régime général. In absence of carefully 
thought protest avoidance strategies, radical labor unions acted as “ideological veto players” as 
they defeated the pension component of the Juppé Plan. 
This being said, although most observers focus on the fact that the pension elements (with 
the exception of the budget approval by the Parliament) were removed from the Juppé Plan, one 
must emphasize that virtually all healthcare provisions were enacted. Thus, is the Juppé Plan an 
complete failure? The streets made Juppé take away more than he wanted (for example, the 
Balladur (1993) and the Fillon (2003) reforms kept virtually every element of their original 
plan), but key elements of his reform were implemented beyond the pension domain. This 
illustrates the logic of “reform overload” that allows policy-makers to enact unpopular measures 
in spite of labor opposition. As unions concentrate on some elements of a multifaceted reform 
proposal, political actors can enact lower-profile measures included in the plan after dropping the 
most controversial proposals. As part of the Juppé Plan, the health measures represented a direct 
threat to FO, which controlled many managerial boards because the government took these 
responsibilities. However, diluted into a package with pensions, the latter were considered 
acceptable by other unions once pension reform was off the table. Thus, in the media the focus of 
the Juppé Plan concentrated more on pensions and the movement lost momentum once the Prime 
Minister announced that he would forego reforming pensions.  
Although the 1995 strikes illustrate the potential political power of labor unions in French 
pension politics, their apparent “veto power” is actually fragile because it is grounded in their 
capacity to mobilize workers over long periods of time. In the absence of a formal parliamentary   33
“veto point,” union influence is, in fact, vulnerable to protest avoidance strategies such as the 
ones used in 1993 and 2003. Firstly, dividing unions on pension-related issues is easier to 
achieve in France where the labor world is more fragmented than in other countries.
31 On the one 
hand, as the events of fall 1995 show, the CFDT seems more open to bargain with policy-
makers. On the other hand, more radical unions such as FO and CGT generally adopt a 
confrontational attitude that is coherent with the French labor tradition discussed above.
32 
Dividing unions could represent an effective protest avoidance strategy, especially if combined 
with the “summer strategy” used in 1967, 1993, and 2003. This illustrates the second weakness 
of labor mobilization capacity: as many workers leave Paris and other major cities for their 
summer vacation in July and August, the government can enact potentially unpopular measures 
without provoking immediate and widespread labor mobilization. As stated by FO leader Marc 
Blondel just before the last day of large-scale protest on June 19, 2003: “It’s almost certain that 
this mobilization will be a protest of activists rather than a [massive] popular protest because 
paid vacations are approaching, and unions have repeatedly asked workers to mobilize.” (Le 
Monde, June 19, 2003)    
  The successful enactment of the 2003 reform shows that strategic learning processes took 
place within the French right. In an interview with newspaper Le Monde, Bernard Accoyé, an 
influential official from the ruling party (UMP) argued that everyone on the right “remembers 
1995. This motivates us to remain cautious.” (Le Monde, May 5, 2003) Excluding Juppé from 
the government, adopting—at least in public—a conciliatory attitude, and launching the reform 
at a different time of the year helped the Raffarin government to distinguish itself from the ill-
fated Juppé government and its unsuccessful attempt to reform public pensions. Rejecting the   34
“reform overload” strategy used in 1995, the Raffarin government adopted a far more limited 
reform agenda that facilitated the enactment of the 2003 pension legislation.          
Conclusion  
The above analysis demonstrates that successive right wing French governments have 
succeeded in imposing generally unpopular pension reforms in spite of the difficulties to pursue 
blame avoidance strategies in the context of the strong concentration of state power that 
characterizes the French policy. Three protest avoidance strategies have facilitated the enactment 
of unpopular reforms: dividing the labor camp, “reform overload,” and enacting measures when 
unions cannot organize massive political strikes. In France, elected officials have made 
systematic efforts to avoid labor’s disruptive strike activities, which have the capacity to paralyze 
the nation while increasing the political risks associated with retrenchment. Protest avoidance 
thus constitutes a key aspect of the “new politics of the welfare state” in that country. As 
demonstrated above, the three most important alterations to the pension system established after 
World War II (1967, 1993, 2003) have occurred in the middle of summer, a period of the year 
during which potential strikers take their vacation. Consequently, a cyclical policy window exists 
in the summer following legislative elections. Similar but more risky opportunities are present 
each summer as we near the end of the electoral calendar.  
While underlining the fact that protest avoidance can emerge as a significant variable in 
social politics, the analysis of French pension reforms since the 1960s at least partially 
invalidates Ross’s “Nixon goes to China” thesis (2000). Considering that right wing 
governments have enacted the three most comprehensive pension retrenchment efforts in France 
since the 1960s, this argument does not hold sway, at least in the field of pension reform. In fact, 
the French pension reform experience confirms the thesis of Korpi and Palme (2003) that risks 
for major cuts lie with right wing governments. Despite being associated with popular measures   35
such as the establishment of the retirement age at 60, the Left has not played a crucial political 
role in implementing pension reforms since the early 1990s. As evidenced by the latest 2003 
pension reform, a major difficulty has been internal divisions. Key Socialist figures, such as 
Laurent Fabius and Dominique Strauss-Kahn, supported the Fillon Plan while Socialist deputies 
where criticizing and delaying the passage of the bill in Parliament. In fact, the right has been 
able to use the left’s divisions to its advantage. The contrast between Balladur’s aggressive 
approach to retrenchment (using a report presented and published by the former Socialist Prime 
Minister, Michel Rocard), and the purely consultative attitude of the left wing Jospin government 
also provides ground to this claim. On the one hand, it would have been difficult to introduce 
reforms since the Jospin government was elected in the aftermath of December 1995. On the 
other hand, this government could have put its stamp on the issue by reforming pensions in its 
own way. This could have meant a closer cooperation with the unions. Although the left can 
indeed pursue protest avoidance strategies, right wing governments seem especially keen on 
mobilizing them in order to impose unpopular conservative reforms.  
Beyond the French case, we hope that this article will contribute to the international 
debate concerning the nature of the “new politics of the welfare state.” Protest avoidance 
deserves serious attention as it affects policy outcomes while being analytically distinct from 
blame avoidance. Although scholars have started to systematically analyze the relationship 
between social mobilization and social security reform, protest avoidance remains an 
understudied phenomenon that seems present in other countries where widespread social 
mobilizations, for example, represents a major source of concern for policy-makers. In other 
countries such as Italy, governments have attempted to divide labor unions, overload the reform 
agenda, and/or enact measures at a time during which workers seldom mobilize.
33 In the future,   36
students of social policy could extend the methodic analysis of protest avoidance beyond the 
French case. In addition to its academic relevance, these new studies could help union officials to 
frame counter-strategies directed against governments pursuing a conservative social policy 
agenda.  
Yet the concept of protest avoidance could also prove useful beyond the study of labor 
mobilizations in welfare state politics. Firstly, in the field of social policy, protest avoidance may 
extend beyond the prevention of labor protest and concern the political neutralization of senior 
organizations and specific social movements, for example. Secondly, protest avoidance 
represents a set of strategies that probably extend well beyond the social policy domain. When 
certain public policies prove unpopular and trigger social unrest, policy-makers may attempt to 
reduce the mobilization capacities of those labor unions and social movements involved in policy 
debates. Considering this, future research on protest avoidance could help social scientists to 
understand better the politics of public policy reform in contemporary societies.     
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 In this article, social mobilization is understood as dialogically tied to the behaviour of state 
actors, whose decisions represent potential “threats” that may stimulate collective action. On the 
concept of threat, see Tilly, 1978.   
2 One must note that massive strike activities are not impossible in France, as they occurred in 
August 1953 (Shorter and Tilly, 1974: 139-140).  At the time, however, paid summer vacations 
were significantly shorter than today, and labor unions were exceptionally politicized.  
3 A comparison between Japan and France provides further ground to that claim (Miura and 
Palier, 2003). 
4 In a way, elected officials facing the threat of massive strikes pursue both blame and protest 
avoidance strategies as massive strikes constitute potential blame generating situations. 
5 In his 1986 article, Weaver distinguishes between eight specific blame-avoiding strategies: 1) 
agenda limitation (avoiding potentially costly policy alternatives); 2) redefining the issue 
(framing less costly policy options); 3) throw good money after bad (preventing key 
constituencies from suffering losses); 4) pass the buck (forcing other political actors to take the 
potentially costly decisions); 5) find a scapegoat (blaming others for unpopular measures); 6) 
jump on the bandwagon (support politically popular options); 7) circle the wagons (diffusing 
blame among many different actors); 8) finally, “stop me before I kill again” (policy-makers act 
against their own policy preferences in order to prevent blame generation situations) (Weaver, 
1986: 385).   
6 For example, the “power resource approch” is grounded on the assumtion that labor 
mobilization shapes social policy outcomes (Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1985).   
7 See Heclo (1974).   45
                                                                                                                                                             
8 Despite tackling electoral issues, Pierson (1994) does not consider that implementing cutbacks 
at the beginning of a mandate can reduce the risk of the electoral backlash. 
9 However, the President is highly influential when his party controls the National Assembly and, 
thus, forms the government. The President then becomes some sort of a Prime Minister since he 
really leads the cabinet. 
10 In a referendum held on September 24, 2000, 73 percent of the French voters supported a 
reduction in the President’s term from 7 to 5 years. Consequently, the existence of a long gap 
between presidential and legislative elections now appears impossible.   
11 In the footsteps of Powell’s (2000) analysis on electoral systems, a key element of the 
argument is that, in a majoritarian system, voting is post-ante (i.e. electors cast their vote on the 
basis of their evaluation of the government’s performance while in a PR (proportional 
representation) system, electors elect representatives to defend their interests; (elections are pre-
ante).  
12 On the concept of “repertoire of contention,” see Tilly, 1978 and 1986. See also Tarrow, 1994.  
13 French labor unions are not keen on providing scholars with detailed membership data. We 
would like to thank labor researcher Jean-Marie Pernot for sharing this sensitive data with us. 
14 Civil servants were define as  “all those qualified as agent or assistant agent working 
permanently within a public service of the State, compensated by a monthly pay or by the 
allocation of bonuses and leading to the eventual benefit of a retirement pension” (cited in Friot, 
1994: 50).  
15 This would the English equivalent of a National Center for (Graduate) Studies on Social 
Security. 
16 On paritarisme, see Dufourcq, 1995; Friot 1998; Guillemard 1986; Revue de l’IRES 1997.   46
                                                                                                                                                             
17 On the necessity for policy-makers to construct the “need to reform” in a systematic manner, 
see Cox, 2001.  
18 Which the Socialists did in 1998. 
19 As mentioned above, certain categories of civil servants have special schemes due to the type 
of profession they exercise and historical particularities. Train, subway, and opera workers are 
three well-known categories of professions that benefit from these pension schemes. In many 
cases, full pension rights are granted prior to 60 years old, which is the legal age of retirement in 
France. 
20 Such a common front had not been seen since 1978 (Pitruzzelli, 1997). 
21 Considering its broad sectoral and geographic diffusion, this strike movement appeared as a 
brief “cycle of protest.” On this concept, see Tarrow, 1994.  
22 This influential politician is now a minister in the Raffarin Government. 
23 Until recently, French presidents were elected for seven years (as opposed to five years for 
deputies). 
24 The political climate surrounding the issue was already confrontational. The Cour des comptes 
(French Audit institutions) had a few days earlier brought pension reform to the forefront of the 
political agenda by criticizing what it called the “favor regime” (régime de faveur) held by 
specific employees in the public sector. As an example, it underlines the policy that gives full 
retirement benefits for women working in the civil service after only 15 years of service if she 
has three children.  
25 The government stated that it plans to reform them on an individual basis in the upcoming 
years.   47
                                                                                                                                                             
26 Over the past two decades, the participation of older workers in the French labor market has 
been rapidly declining and, with counties like Belgium and Italy, France has one of the lowest 
employment activities in Europe for the 55-65 age group (Guillamard, 2001). 
27 For a discussion of quid pro quo logic during the 2003 pension debate, see Natali and Rhodes, 
forthcoming.  
28 Few federations even continued their actions onto May 14. 
29 The CFDT also ‘obtained’ the assurance that the penalty of 10 percent applied to those who 
retire before 60 years old without a full career would be reduce to 5 percent, and the so-called 
primes (added wages to the official rank granted to many civil servants, which does not carry 
benefits) would be taken into account for the calculation of pension benefits.  
30 According to Le Monde, the CGT was torned between seeking genuine negociations and its 
wish to extend social protests. The leadership of the union proved unable to present a coherent 
plan (Le Monde, July 23, 2003).  
31 Since the late 1990s, France’s business lobby has also gained much ideological visibility, 
which seems detrimental to union power. The Movement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF), 
which replaced the Conseil National du Patronat Français (CNPF) as the most powerful French 
business organization in 1998, has proved surprisingly successful in launching its “Social 
Refoundation” platform. This conservative platform aims at convincing French policy-makers 
and labor officials to accept a comprehensive reform of social policy and labor relations oriented 
towards flexibility and market principles. Although labor unions have protested loudly against 
MEDEF proposals, the advent of a right wing government in 2002 has further increased the 
influence of the MEDEF on French politics.   48
                                                                                                                                                             
32 The quid pro quo of 1993 mentioned above applies to CFDT, since granting retirement 
benefits prior to age 60 for those who started working full time at age 14-15 had been a known 
CFDT demand for the past 15 years.   
33 For a comparison between pension reform in France and Italy, see Natali and Rhodes, 
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